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The problematic neglect of phenomenology 
in contemporary psychiatry
An adequate understanding of the phenomena of the psychoses 
remains elusive. This might seem a rather perplexing observation 
given strenuous research endeavours and a wealth of scientific 
information, particularly in recent years in the domains of 
molecular biology and neuro-imaging. A wide range of factors 
may be held to account for these limitations, one being that 
the brain is the most complex thing in the known universe, and 
should not be expected to yield its workings in much the same 
way as broken bones. Another is the enduring and profoundly 
mysterious gulf between observable neurobiological events and, 
for example, the experience of having thoughts inserted into one’s 
brain, an enigma as much for philosophers as for psychiatrists. 
Related to this is a problem that some might regard as among the 
most significant achievements of modern psychiatry, the ICD and 
DSM diagnostic systems. 
These systems served to bring a degree of order into the 
confusion of psychiatric nosology, and strove to meet, at least to 
some extent, the criteria of reliability and objectivity in order for 
psychiatry to achieve its scientific aspirations. This advance has 
had a number of possibly unanticipated consequences. One is 
that certain diagnostic categories have become reified, whereby 
a tentative, hypothetical construct, having perhaps a degree of 
validity in the light of current knowledge, is endowed with an 
inappropriate and confining independent status, and possibly a 
more doubtful validity in the light of subsequent knowledge. 
Another related consequence is the relative neglect of 
phenomenology.1 The issue is complicated by the various 
meanings attached to the term. Broadly, and most familiar to 
clinicians, is the use of the term phenomenology in a merely 
descriptive sense, in identifying the symptoms and signs of mental 
illness. Phenomenology is also used to describe a methodology, 
in the rigorous account of a person’s singular experience of the 
world, and in the context of philosophical phenomenology, the 
investigation of the nature of experience, as opposed to the 
objects of experience, of not merely how the world is perceived, 
but of being conscious in the world.2 Clearly, within this range 
of meanings there is a tension between objective third-person 
accounts of mental states and subjective, first-person accounts, 
and in order to arrive at an adequate understanding of mental 
illness neither perspective can be disregarded.
Understanding psychotic phenomena must necessarily include 
the first-person account: neglecting this merely because it does 
not meet the criteria of scientific objectivity limits understanding 
and undermines scientific rigour.3 In current practice there 
appears to be a gulf between diagnostic explanations and a 
sufficient understanding of the predicament of the individual 
in a specific personal and social context.4 An adequate 
understanding of the phenomena of schizophrenia, for example, 
is lacking, and will require an integration of three levels: the 
neurobiological derangement, the aberrant cognitive processes 
at the psychological level, and the personal idiosyncratic 
experience of these processes.5 Diagnostic explanations and 
meaningful understanding should not be considered dichotomous, 
but standard clinical practice and research programmes seem 
to disregard the need to integrate the two perspectives, both to 
foster an improved therapeutic alliance and also to clarify the 
neurobiological basis for more disease-specific symptoms.  
A further concern of the ‘tick-box’ psychiatry engendered by these 
overarching diagnostic systems is what might be considered the 
premature foreclosing on phenomena that require deeper levels 
of understanding. In the outpatient department of the public 
hospital where I work a beguiling gentleman with a diagnosis 
of schizophrenia regularly attends, although he steadfastly 
refuses to take medication. According to standard diagnostic 
criteria, and any number of rating scales, he demonstrates a 
formal thought disorder. Yet this description seems inadequate, 
and limits any further understanding of phenomena that might 
possibly have explanatory value. He told me: ‘… She took you 
to me … No one wants him, she told you … make sure you 
mention your own faults …’ On attending a little more closely to 
his utterances, it becomes evident that he is referring not to myself 
as the interviewer but to himself, in both the second and the third 
person. There is a minimal use of ‘I’ in his discourse; he shifts quite 
bewilderingly and constantly between first-, second- and third-
person perspectives. Looking beyond the surface phenomena 
may therefore yield potentially informative indicators of core 
deficits that are otherwise obscured: with regard to this instance, 
the shifting use of the personal pronoun suggests a disturbance 
of the self, or of self-consciousness, regarded by a number of 
commentators as the core deficit of schizophrenia.6
Yet another related concern arising from the possibly inappropriate 
use of the diagnostic systems is the lack of scientific validity 
underscoring the various diagnostic categories, the arbitrariness 
of operational criteria and a considerable overlap both between 
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categories of mental disorders and between mental disorders 
and what might be considered to lie within the wide range of 
non-pathological human experience. This applies most obviously 
to problems such as anxiety and depression, but also to psychotic 
phenomena. The debate as to whether psychosis should be 
regarded as a category or a dimension has persisted for years, 
and again seems bound up in the tensions between validity 
and reliability. The argument for psychotic phenomena to be 
regarded as a spectrum has been given impetus by the recent 
attention being paid to the prevalence of psychotic experiences 
in the general, relatively healthy population.7 Many persons 
simply find ways of coping with psychotic experiences, at times 
creatively. Granting meaning, and embedding the phenomena in 
personal, social and cultural contexts, seem to be powerful ways 
of alleviating the distress that might otherwise ensue. Perhaps 
enabled by the world of Facebook, a young man in our ward told 
us of voices requesting to be his ‘friend’. In another context, others 
in the same ward appear to be consoled by the belief that the 
voices they hear are communications from the ancestors. Merely 
defining these experiences as auditory hallucinations seems 
impoverished. Critically important information regarding both the 
meaning attached to the experience and the way people live with 
such experiences is neglected. 
The issue of meaning attached to experience is of concern 
because it determines whether or not intervention is required, 
and what form of intervention might be most appropriate. Ethical 
dimensions of course pertain, and reflect a tension between 
paternalism and a more respectful, collaborative way of trying 
to help people living with psychotic experiences. If it is not the 
symptom itself but the distress or impairments it engenders, it is for 
the person who experiences these phenomena to decide whether 
or not they constitute a problem, or a symptom, and whether 
or not help is needed. The clinician, declaring a diagnosis of 
schizophrenia on the basis of hallucinations and other psychotic 
phenomena, might more usefully seek to understand what 
sense the person makes of the experiences, and to what extent 
they cause distress and impair functioning, as a more effective 
basis for further management. The assumption that psychotic 
experiences are inherently pathological and should therefore be 
suppressed needs to be reconsidered. 
Another assumption underpinning the way psychosis is understood 
and therefore treated is the notion that the person with a psychotic 
disorder somehow misperceives the world ‘out there’, whereas 
the healthy general population appraises the world in a more 
accurate and appropriate way. This rather simplistic distinction 
is called into question by current neurocognitive formulations of 
the way the world is perceived, and enters into consciousness. 
This is of importance if the current notions of what might constitute 
schizophrenia as a disorder of consciousness are accepted. For 
over a hundred years it has been evident that sensory signals 
are relatively crude and elemental and that a time lag exists 
before the signals reach consciousness. Perceptions are therefore 
conceptualised as relatively unconscious inferences about the 
world. Perceptions are beliefs about the world: the notion of some 
sort of direct and more or less accurate perception or mirror image 
of an external world is an illusion.8 We all, whether psychotic or 
not, make up our worlds.
These possibly rather abstract considerations have implications 
both for management and research. If the symptoms of psychosis 
represent constructions, in order to cope as best as possible with 
what at a neurobiological level might be described as noise, 
these endeavours need to be acknowledged rather than merely 
neglected and eliminated. Modulation of salience, limiting distress 
and enhancing the capacity to cope might be more appropriate 
goals of treatment than the suppression of experiences that are 
desperately real for those who suffer.
The fundamental pathophysiological deficits and the ultimate 
causes of the syndrome of schizophrenia remain unknown. 
Looking beyond signs and symptoms and attending to the 
experience of psychosis, and linking this to observable 
psychological phenomena and neurobiological shifts, may 
yield more meaningful and productive results and more valid 
diagnostic constructs. First- and third-person perspectives need 
to be integrated if advances are to be made in the elucidation 
of these enigmatic phenomena. The reductive implementation of 
rigid scientific models has generated a bland and bleak depiction 
of the world of psychosis that does no justice to the extraordinary 
stories we are told.
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